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Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of
Limitations for Section 1983 Claims
The Civil Rights Act of 18711 provides private individuals with
a civil cause of action for deprivation of their constitutional rights. 2
Although many states prescribe a limitations period, the Civil
Rights Act fails to incorporate such a period for a cause of action
initiated by a private plaintiff.3 When federal legislation fails to es-
tablish a limitations period, the courts adopt a local statute of limi-
tations as federal law.4
While this practice usually works well, two problems arise with
section 1983 claims. 5 First, federal courts disagree on how to de-
termine the applicable state limitations period. Each state has sev-
eral limitations statutes, and federal courts presently use different
analyses to determine which one to apply.6 The Supreme Court
partially solved this problem in Wilson v. Garcia.7 Second, section
1983 is a federal statute. Adopting a state statute of limitations al-
lows the state, if it chooses, to limit or expand that federal law.
This affords the state the opportunity to impose its own will over
federal law when the state's interest conflicts with federal interests. 8
Part I of this note examines the relevant law, before and after
the Wilson decision, concerning the statute of limitations in a sec-
tion 1983 private cause of action. Part II reviews the judicial inter-
pretations of the Wilson rule. Part III discusses the inherent conflicts
involved when a federal right is subjected to state law. Finally, Part
IV concludes that, absent specific Supreme Court direction, Con-
gress should act to resolve the problems plaguing litigants in this
area.
I. Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Section 1983 Claims:
Status of the Law
A. Judicial Treatment Prior to Wilson v. Garcia
Section 19839 provides a private individual with a civil cause of
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See note 9 infra.
2 See notes 9-11 infra and accompanying text.
3 See notes 12-13 infra and accompanying text.
4 See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See note 9 infra.
6 See notes 18-73 infra and accompanying text.
7 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). See notes 34-52 infra and accompanying text.
8 See notes 74-97 infra and accompanying text.
9 Originally enacted as § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), ch. 22,
17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). This section provides:
action against any person'0 who deprives the litigant of any consti-
tutionally guaranteed right, privilege, or immunity under color of
law."t Although Congress provided aggrieved parties with a private
cause of action for infringement of their constitutional rights, Con-
gress specifically omitted enacting a statute of limitations 12 to gov-
ern section 1983 cases.13 The void created by this omission, while
unfortunate, is hardly uncommon in federal legislation. t 4 When
Congress fails to provide a governing limitations period for a par-
ticular piece of legislation, the established practice of federal courts
is to "adopt" or "borrow" a local limitations period as federal law15
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
10 The term "person" in § 1983 includes private individuals and corporations acting
under color of law, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and local govern-
mental entities and natural persons such as state, county, and municipal officials, Monell v.
New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Courts conflict on whether
states are "persons" for the purposes of § 1983. Compare Smith v. Michigan, 122 Mich.
App. 340, 348-52, 333 N.W.2d 50, 54-56 (1983) (state is a "person") with Edgar v. State,
595 P.2d 534, 537-38 (Wash. 1979) (en banc) (state is not a "person"), cert. denied sub nom.
Edgar v. Washington, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980). See also Note, Amenability of States to Section 1983
Suits: Reexamining Quern v.Jordan, 62 B.U.L. REV. 731 (1982) (arguing that states are "per-
sons" under § 1983).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see note 9 supra. This statute does not create substantive
rights. Rather, it provides a remedy for the violation of rights created elsewhere in federal
law. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1979). See
also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) ("All civil suits ... which this act autho-
rizes, are not based upon it; they are based upon the right of the citizen. The act only gives
a remedy.") (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
12 Statutes of limitation govern the "limited period of time ... for the bringing of an
action and, if the action is not commenced in time, the lapse of time will constitute a de-
fense to the suit or will deprive the plaintiff of his right." W. FERGUSON, THE STATUrES OF
LIMrrATION SAVING STATUTES 1 (1978).
13 See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S.
318 (1914).
14 Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483.
15 The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), provides statutory authority for
adopting a state statute of limitations as federal law. Invoking this authority, federal courts
have applied state limitations periods to a variety of cases. The Act provides: "The laws of
the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions
in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id. The Court first applied
the Act to require borrowing of a local limitations period in McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 167 (1830) (a six year state statute used to bar a malfeasance claim against a registrar
of an United States land office). A state statute of limitations was first used to limit an
exclusive federal right in Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) (a six year state statute
used to bar a patent infringement claim). The Act was extended to the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts in O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914) (case brought under § 1983 and
§ 1985 based on a conspiracy to deprive citizens of voting rights). Further statutory author-
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as long as this period does not conflict with federal law or federal
policy concerns. 16 Congress has implicitly endorsed this approach
with regard to claims brought under the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts.' 7
Prior to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Wilson v. Garcia,'8 the Supreme Court instructed lower federal
courts to select the "most appropriate,"' 9 or "the most analo-
gous" 20 state statute of limitations when hearing section 1983
cases. Although the Supreme Court required this, the Court pro-
vided lower courts with little guidance in choosing the most appro-
priate statute of limitations. 2' Each circuit had to develop its own
reasoned approach in determining the appropriate statute of
limitations. 22
Before Wilson, the approaches utilized by the circuits fell into
two separate categories. 23 Some circuits applied a factual approach
in determining the appropriate limitation which required an analy-
sis of the facts leading to the alleged injury.24 Others reasoned that
ity is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see note 17 infra. Courts have also justified borrow-
ing local statutes of limitations as the appropriate interpretation of congressional intent. See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
16 See, e.g., McCrary, 427 U.S. at 180-82 (1976); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-05 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); Campbell v.
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895).
17 The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) provides:
In all cases where [the provisions of this Title] ... are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the com-
mon law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as
the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause.
Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court approved the use of state statutes of limitations
for civil rights cases in O'Sullivan, 233 U.S. 318. The Supreme Court now considers this
practice mandated by § 1988. See Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2928-29 (1984);
Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 655-56, 661 (1983); Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 484-86;Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975).
18 105 S. Ct. 193R (1985).
19 Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 462.
20 Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488.
21 See Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil Rights Dilemma, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 14
(1983).
22 Id. at 15.
23 Id. at 16-34. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (1984), ajfd, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985)
(a scholarly analysis of the different methods employed by the federal circuits prior to W1il-
son when faced with a § 1983 limitations issue). See also Jarmie, Selecting an Analogous State
Limitations Statute in Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts Claims: The Tenth Circuit's Resolution, 15
N.M.L. REV. 11 (1985). See generally Special Project, Civil Rights, 62 DEN. L. REV. 59 (1985).
24 Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983); McGhee v. Ogburn, 707 F.2d 1312
(11th Cir. 1983); McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Morrell v. City of Pica-
yune, 690 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982); Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.
1982); Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1981); Zuniga v.
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because the source of the federal cause of action was statutory, the
appropriate statute of limitations was one based upon liability cre-
ated by statute.25 By selecting one of these methods of analysis,
each state would be internally consistent. There would be, how-
ever, no consistency among the states. 26
Moreover, even the methods themselves created problems.
The factual analysis method proved most problematic. This analy-
sis required courts to rely upon the often misleading allegations in
the pleadings.27 In Wilson, the Supreme Court noted that this ap-
proach "inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming litiga-
tion that is foreign to the central purposes of § 1983."28 The Court
also recognized that "[a]lmost every § 1983 claim can be favorably
analogized to more than one of the ancient common-law forms of
action, each of which may be governed by a different statute of limi-
tations." 29 While the factual approach caused confusion, the other
approach, the statutory liability analogy, is not analytically cor-
rect.30 Section 1983 itself does not create substantive rights; the
underlying rights it enforces originate elsewhere in federal law.3 1
Therefore, this method of analysis "is flawed in that it focuses on
the statutory remedy and away from the elements of the cause of
action." 32 The problems with the two approaches have added to
the existing confusion in this area and have led to further incon-
sistent applications of the law. 33
AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978). See also Garcia, 731 F.2d at 643-48;
Biehler, supra note 21, at 15-27.
25 Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982);
Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981); Pauk v. Board of Trust-
ees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980); Beard v.
Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978). See also Garcia, 731
F.2d at 643-48; Biehler, supra note 21, at 27-33.
26 Biehler, supra note 21, at 34.
27 Commentators have openly criticized this method. See Biehler, supra note 2 1; Note,
A Callfor Uniformity: Statutes of Limitation in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 61
(1979); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIz. ST. LJ.
97; Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 548 (1979).
28 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1945.
29 Id.
30 Jarmie, supra note 23, at 25.
31 See note 11 supra.
32 Jarmie, supra note 23, at 25.
33 See Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. LJ.
97. The commentator noted that:
Inconsistency in the time periods for bringing suit from state to state poses
only a minor inconvenience to litigants when compared with the difficulties they
face in determining which state statute of limitation applies to the facts of a partic-
ular case. The problem has assumed substantial proportions. In some circuits
today neither plaintiffs nor defendants can know whether a federal civil rights
claim is barred unless they seek a circuit decision on the facts of the case.
Id. at 98 (footnote omitted). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 548, 553-54 (1979).
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B. The Effect of Wilson v. Garcia
In Wilson v. Garcia, 34 the respondent brought a cause of action
under section 1983 against a New Mexico state police officer and
the chief of the state police. 35 The respondent sought damages to
compensate him for the deprivation of his constitutional rights;3 6
specifically, an unlawful arrest and vicious beating by the officer.3 7
Respondent filed the complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico two years and nine months after the
alleged incident. 38 The New Mexico Tort Claims Act provided a
two year statute of limitations which would have barred respon-
dent's claim.3 9 The district court denied petitioners' motion to dis-
miss the action under the New Mexico statute40 and certified an
interlocutory appeal. 4'
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc,
unanimously affirmed the district court's order denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss.42 The court concluded that "every section 1983
claim is in essence an action for injury to personal rights." 43 There-
fore, the court held that for cases arising in New Mexico, courts
should use a three year statute44 which applies to injury to the per-
son or reputation. 45
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari46 because
"the conflict, confusion, and uncertainty concerning the appropri-
ate statute of limitations to apply to this most important, and ubiq-
uitous, civil rights statute provided compelling reasons." 47 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision, with Justice
O'Connor dissenting.48 The Court held that section 1983 civil
34 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
35 Id. at 1940.
36 As guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1978).
40 The district court held that "§ 1983 actions are best characterized as actions based on
statute." Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941 (quoting appendix to petition for cert. 43-44) (emphasis
added).
41 The interlocutory appeal was certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
42 Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984).
43 Id. at 651.
44 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978).
45 731 F.2d at 651.
46 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984).
47 105 S. Ct. at 1942.
48 Id. at 1949. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor pursued three primary avenues of at-
tack. First, she argued that the Court, perceiving a need for uniformity, "simply seized the
opportunity to legislate it" even though Congress considered standardizing the § 1983 lim-
itations period recently and failed to enact appropriate legislation. Id. at 1951. Upon care-
ful reading of the Wilson opinion, however, it becomes clear that the foundation for the
Court's opinion was an analysis of the intent of the Congress to address offenses closely
analogous to personal injury torts. The Court successfully augmented its position by not-
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rights claims "are best characterized as personal injury actions." 49
The Court based its determination on an analysis of the intent of
Congress in enacting this legislation,50 emphasizing that "[t]he
atrocities that concerned Congress in 1871 plainly sounded in
tort." 51 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected both the factual analysis
method and the statutory liability analogy method to determine the
appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983 claims. The new
rule provides that the appropriate statute of limitations for section
1983 cases is the state statute applicable to personal injury
actions.52
II. Judicial Interpretations of the New "Borrowing" Rule
The Supreme Court's decision in Wilson will not solve all
problems associated with section 1983 actions. The decision, how-
ever, at least provides a degree of much needed direction in an area
of law where little existed before. 53 After Wilson, the lower federal
courts which had utilized the flawed factual analysis method 54 will
be relieved of determining the appropriate limitations period on a
case by case and issue by issue basis. Moreover, the courts which
formerly applied the limitations period appropriate for actions cre-
ated by statute will no longer be required to use a method which is
analytically imprecise and which neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress explicitly sanctioned as proper.55 Therefore, the Wilson
decision mitigates the conflict, confusion, and uncertainty which
has concerned both courts and commentators. 56 Presently, to de-
ing that the present (pre-Wilson) "borrowing" rules actually interfere with the enforcement
of the Civil Rights Act, clearly a situation Congress wanted to avoid. Thus, the Court did
not merely seize the opportunity to legislate uniformity. Instead, it handed down a well-
reasoned opinion, consistent with the intent of Congress in this area, and also consistent
with the objective of effective civil rights enforcement. Justice O'Connor argued further
that the Wilson decision "effectively forecloses legislative creativity on the part of the
States." Id. at 1952. Justice O'Connor, however, failed to adequately address the fact that
§ 1983 is a federal right designed to promote federal interests and federal policies. States
enact statutes of limitations with their own state interests in mind, not with concern for
federal interests. "Legislative creativity on the part of the States" (id.) is simply not appro-
priate in this situation. Justice O'Connor's final argument that "there is no guarantee state
law will obligingly supply a limitations period to match [the Wilson] analogy," id. at 1953, is
addressed in the text of this note. See text accompanying notes 58-73 infra.
49 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1949.
50 Id. at 1947-49.
51 Id. at 1948.
52 Id. at 1949.
53 See notes 18-33 supra and accompanying text.
54 See notes 24, 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
55 See notes 25, 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Garcia, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d
Cir. 1983); Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1983); McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d
366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Morrell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982); Kilgore v.
City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1982); Garmon v. Faust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.)
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termine the appropriate limitations period for section 1983 suits,
all federal courts, in accordance with Wilson, will utilize the local
limitations period applicable to personal injury actions.5 7
Although Wilson is a relatively recent decision,5 8 many lower
federal courts have subsequently faced section 1983 limitations is-
sues. The weight of authority thus far indicates that the Wilson deci-
sion has been enthusiastically received and competently applied by
the lower courts. 59 A United States district court, however, found
sufficient ambiguity in Wilson to hand down a ruling inconsistent
with the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in that case.
In Shorters v. City of Chicago,60 the plaintiffs filed suit in July 1985
against the City of Chicago and a police officer under section 1983.
The plaintiffs sought damages for an alleged violation of their civil
rights in August 1982.61 Applying Wilson, the defendants moved to
dismiss plaintiffs' complaint because the applicable two year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions barred the claim.62 Plain-
tiffs countered by arguing that the applicable statute of limitations
was not the two year statute advocated by defendants, but instead
was the five year catch-all statute.63 Ruling in favor of the plaintiffs,
the Shorters court held that the applicable statute of limitations to be
applied to section 1983 actions in Illinois is the five year catch-all
statute; therefore, the plaintiffs filed their complaint within the stat-
utory period. 64 This decision is directly contrary to Wilson. The Wil-
(en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc); Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981);
Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982);
Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); Biehler, supra note 21;Jarmie, supra note 23.
57 See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text.
58 The Court decided Wilson on April 17, 1985.
59 Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985); Altair Corp. v. Pesquera De Busquets,
769 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1985); Bailey v. Faulkner, 765 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1985); Serrano v.
Torres, 764 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1985); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.
1985); Burkhart v. Randles, 764 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1985); Knoll v. Springfield Township
School Dist. 763 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1985);Jones v. Precuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (11th
Cir. 1985); Acoffv. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1985).
60 617 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
61 Id. at 661-62.
62 Id. at 662. The Illinois statute is codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 13-202 (1984).
63 617 F. Supp. at 662-63. The relevant portion of that section provides:
[A]ctions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitra-
tion, or to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal, or to
recover possession of personal property or damages for the detention or conver-
sion thereof, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within
5 years next after the cause of action accrued.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 13-205 (1984) (emphasis added).
64 617 F. Supp. at 666.
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son Court would have applied the personal injury, rather than the
catch-all, statute of limitations. 65
Initially, the Shorters decision seems to reflect Justice
O'Connor's concern in her Wilson dissent that "there is no guaran-
tee state law will obligingly supply a limitations period to match an
abstract analogy." 66 Because the two year limitations statute failed
to encompass the broad range of potential remedies available
under section 1983, the Shorters court opted to apply the five year
catch-all statute. The Shorters courtjustified this decision with heavy
reliance on dictum in Wilson emphasizing that section 1983 claims
are broadly used by aggrieved parties in modern times to remedy a
variety of wrongs. 67
The Shorters court correctly noted the broad use of section
1983 actions in modem times. The court, however, plainly ignored
the Supreme Court's explicit holding that section 1983 claims
should be characterized more narrowly as personal injury actions
when determining an appropriate limitations period.68 The Wilson
opinion emphasized this point several times. 69 The court could
have applied the two year statute of limitations in this case consist-
ently with the Wilson directive. Therefore, Shorters cannot realisti-
cally be characterized as a case in which state law failed to provide a
limitations period to match the Wilson analogy. In ruling contrary
65 The Shorters court ruled, in the alternative, that even if the applicable statute of limi-
tations for section 1983 cases in Illinois is, in fact, the two year statute, the plaintiffs' case
still should not be barred. The court reasoned that because the Wilson rule operated to
reduce the applicable limitations period in Illinois, potential plaintiffs should be given a
reasonable amount of time after the decision, as determined by state law, to file § 1983
actions which would have been timely under the prior statute of limitations. Id. at 667-68.
The court based its decision upon the following factors:
1. Plaintiffs are likely to have relied on the [previous] rule.
2. Nonretroactivity would not seriously jeopardize the policies of uniformity,
certainty and minimization of unnecessary litigation, while it would serve the
broad remedial purposes of Section 1983.
3. Retroactive application would impose a burden of inequity on plaintiffs.
Id. at 667. The plaintiffs filed suit 75 days after Wilson was decided. The Shorters court
determined that this was a reasonable period according to the applicable state law. Id. at
668. The court's reasoning in determining the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983
claims was flawed and, therefore, should not be followed. In light of the potential inequi-
ties involved in this case, if the court had strictly applied Wilson, its alternative holding was
probably correct.
66 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See note 48 supra.
67 617 F. Supp. at 663-64. The Shorters court attempted to augment its position by
noting that "Illinois adheres to the principle that a statute of limitations bars only actions
coming clearly within its terms." Id. at 666 n.6. The Shorters court, however, blatantly ig-
nored the Supreme Court's explicit direction to apply the local personal injury statute of
limitations to § 1983 actions. See notes 46-52 supra and notes 68-69 infra and accompanying
text.
68 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1949.
69 For example, the Supreme Court noted the following:
"mhe Court of Appeals concluded that the tort action for the recovery of damages for
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to Wilson, the Shorters court merely seized upon dictum in Wilson in a
weak attempt to harmonize its decision with recent Supreme Court
doctrine.
Although the Shorters case does not represent the foregoing
problem identified by Justice O'Connor,70 it is merely a matter of
time before such a case arises. Should this problem materialize,
however, a practical solution is readily available. Wilson provides
the analysis for determining the statute of limitations applicable to
section 1983 claims. A court should look first to a local statute of
limitations expressly applicable to personal injury actions.7 1 If such
a statute is not available, the court could then apply the local statute
actually utilized by the local courts in determining a limitations pe-
riod for personal injury actions. 72 Unfortunately, Wilson does not
go so far as to provide for this situation. 73
III. Problems Remaining After Wilson
A. Conflicting Interests: State Interest v. Federal Interest
A potentially serious problem in limiting section 1983 actions
looms on the horizon. Section 1983 claims are designed to protect
particularly important federal interests; mainly, effective enforce-
ment of fourteenth amendment guarantees.74 But, section 1983
personal injuries is the best alternative available. We agree that this choice is supported by
the nature of the § 1983 remedy." Id. at 1947 (citations omitted).
"The atrocities that concerned Congress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort." Id. at 1948.
"Congress unquestionably would have considered the remedies established in the Civil
Rights Act to be more analogous to tort claims for personal injury." Id. at 1948.
"In essence, § 1983 creates a cause of action where there has been injury, under color
of state law, to the person or to the constitutional or federal statutory rights which emanate
from or are guaranteed to the person. In the broad sense, every cause of action under
§ 1983 which is well-founded results from 'personal injuries.'" Id. at 1948 (quoting Al-
mond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972)).
"In view of our holding that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, the
Court of Appeals correctly applied the 3-year statute of limitations governing actions 'for
an injury to the person or reputation of any person.'" Id. at 1949 (emphasis added).
70 See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text. See also note 48 supra.
71 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1949.
72 When a legitimate question arises regarding which particular statute of limitation
should apply, judicial policy favors application of the longer statute. See Marshall v. Kleppe,
637 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 1980); Shah v. Halliburton, 627 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir.
1980); Reid v. Volkswagon of Am., 512 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975); Payne v. Ostrus,
50 F.2d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 1931).
73 As an alternative, when an explicit statute is unavailable in the jurisdiction, the fed-
eral court could use the method of analysis they utilized prior to Wilson. However, as evi-
denced by the holding in Wilson which rejects the previously employed methods, the
Supreme Court would not likely approve of this alternative.
74 Section 1983 provides a vehicle by which private persons can act to ensure effective
enforcement of their constitutional rights. Congress intended, through § 1983, to promote
peace, justice, and the security of life, liberty, and property through civil enforcement.
A plaintiff's uncertainty over which statute of limitations to apply may invalidate his
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claims are subject to state statutes of limitations. 75 This allows state
law to control the application of constitutional guarantees. Con-
flicts between state and federal interests are inherent in this struc-
ture. The Supreme Court noted that "[s]tate legislatures do not
devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind." 76
State legislatures accordingly enact statutes of limitations that ad-
vance their own policies and goals irrespective of any possible fed-
eral interest. In light of this, it becomes "the duty of the federal
courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate
or interfere with the implementation of national policies." 77 In-
deed, Congress has instructed that state law can apply to civil rights
actions only when the state law does not conflict with federal law.78
The Supreme Court emphasized that even under the Wilson rule,
which borrows local personal injury statutes of limitations, a court
should not adopt the local law if it is inconsistent with either the
federal law or the federal interest involved. 79
The Supreme Court has yet to instruct the lower federal courts
regarding when a state's statute of limitation encroaches upon fed-
eral interests. It remains unclear after Wilson whether a state statute
of limitations for a short period, for example six months, suffi-
ciently protects federal interests.80 It also remains unclear what
remedy a court should fashion if it determines that a state statute of
otherwise valid claim. This uncertainty hampers effective enforcement of civil rights claims.
Uniformity is also a federal interest consistent with the § 1988 borrowing provision; see
note 17 supra and accompanying text. A uniform statute of limitations for § 1983 cases
would ensure that federal courts treat plaintiffs in all jurisdictions with similar claims simi-
larly. See notes 88-97 infra and accompanying text.
75 Wilson continues the lineage of cases recognizing this point. 105 S. Ct. at 1942. See
notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
76 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
77 Id.
78 See note 17 supra.
79 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1943-44. For example, Wilson directs that "state law shall only
apply 'so far as the same is not inconsistent with' federal law." Id. at 1943 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). Also, Wilson noted that "Congress surely did not intend to assign to
state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and
characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action." Id. at 1944.
80 The lower federal courts have recognized that insufficient statutes of limitations
might discriminate against plaintiffs pursuing a recovery under the Civil Rights Acts. The
appropriate durational threshold, however, has been elusive. See, e.g., Gates v. Spinks, 771
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985) (§ 1983 case; one year sufficient); Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d 171
(6th Cir. 1978) (§ 1982 case; 180 days sufficient);Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir.
1978) (§ 1983 case; one year insufficient). The Supreme Court has sanctioned periods as
brief as one year. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) (§ 1983 case); Chardon
v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (§ 1983 case); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454 (1975) (§ 1983 case). The Court refused to authorize the use of a six month
statute of limitations applicable to an administrative action for "borrowing" in a civil rigbts
action. The Supreme Court did not, however, definitively state that the specific problem
with the statute was the limited duration. The limited duration did concern the Court. The
Court was also concerned, however, because the statute, applicable to state administrative
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limitations does not adequately protect federal interests. The Wil-
son decision emphasizes the necessity of protecting the federal in-
terest, a critical area plaguing the federal courts, but provides little
guidance on how to accomplish this objective. To solve the
problems remaining after Wilson, it helps to analyze the general pol-
icies supporting statutes of limitations and the federal interests at
stake in section 1983 cases. Any workable solution will necessarily
involve a balancing of interests in these areas.8 1
B. Statutes of Limitations: Policy Considerations
Statutes of limitations "promote justice by preventing sur-
prises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slum-
ber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared" by requiring the initiation of a cause
of action within a specified time period.8 2 Such limitations periods
promote stability in society8 3 by providing potential defendants
with repose, a precise day in which the threat of a suit is removed.8 4
Moreover, statutes of limitations assist in conserving scarce judicial
resources by relieving the courts of the burden of hearing stale
claims,8 5 thereby allowing courts to concentrate their resources on
current conflicts.8 6 Finally, statutes of limitations effectively express
society's opinion that some actions are more worthwhile than
actions, was not appropriately analogous to civil rights claims. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S.
Ct. 2924 (1984) (§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 case).
While the appropriate durational threshold remains unclear, it is clear that a state can-
not prescribe an unduly short limitations period expressly to circumvent federal law. Such
a period would violate the § 1988 borrowing provision; see note 17 supra. The Court proba-
bly would examine state legislative intent if confronted with this issue. See generally Wallace
v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (the Court examined state legislative intent in a first
amendment case).
81 For example, Wilson was concerned with preserving the policies of repose while pro-
tecting the greater federal interest. Also, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) allows importation of
state law in a federal cause of action provided that state law is not inconsistent with the
federal law; see note 17 supra. See also note 16 supra and accompanying text. See generally
Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969).
82 Order of R.R. Telgraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944). The Court stated that: "The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust
not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."
Id. at 349.
83 Statutes of limitations promote economic stability as well by alleviating the disrup-
tive effects of uncertainty in commercial enterprise. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
84 Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (1979).
See also Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805).
85 Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Right of Action and
State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1016-17 (1980).
86 Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33, 36
(1962). See also Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
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NOTES
others.87 Section 1983 does not incorporate a statute of limitations
nor is there an ancilliary federal statute of limitations that applies to
section 1983 actions. Therefore, the federal interests are not ad-
dressed; it is left up to the states to serve these interests.
C. Effective Enforcement of Section 1983: The Federal Interests
If a local limitations period conflicts with an overriding federal
law or policy, it cannot be applied to a federal cause of action.88
Congress, through section 1983, emphasized the "predominance of
the federal interest"8 9 in civil rights cases. The major federal inter-
est involved in section 1983 actions pertains to the effective en-
forcement of fourteenth amendment guarantees. 90
Congress intended, through section 1983, to promote peace,
justice, and the security of life, liberty, and property through civil
enforcement. 9 1 Section 1983 provides a vehicle by which private
persons can act to ensure effective enforcement of their constitu-
tionally guaranteed civil rights. According to the Supreme Court
"[t]he specific historical catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
the campaign of violence and deception.., which was denying de-
cent citizens their civil and political rights." 92 Given the purpose
and importance of the civil rights leglislation, a federal court cannot
adopt a local limitations period as federal law if it conflicts .with
these goals.
Certainty is another federal interest at stake when a federal
court adopts a local statute of limitations in section 1983 actions.
The Supieme Court has noted that uncertainty in applying statutes
of limitations creates additional litigation. This, in turn, expends
judicial resources and hampers the enforcement of civil rights
claims.9 3 Moreover, a plaintiff's uncertainty over which statute to
apply may invalidate his otherwise valid claim. Similarly, because of
uncertainty, potential defendants cannot properly calculate their
potential liability.94 Thus, the policy concerns underlying statutes
87 Leflar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 MERCER L. REV. 461 (1984). Statutes of
limitations reflect "social attitudes.., that express favor or disfavor toward certain classes
of claims or parties." Id. at 471.
88 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
89 Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2929 (1984).
90 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court stated that:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because.., state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Id. at 180.
91 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1947.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at n.34.
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of limitations are frustrated by "borrowing" state statutes on an ad
hoc basis.
The Supreme Court identified uniformity within each state as a
federal interest consistent with the section 1988 borrowing provi-
sion.95 A uniform statute of limitations for section 1983 actions ap-
plicable to all states would ensure that all potential claims are
treated identically among states. Thus, courts would treat plaintiffs
in all jurisdictions with similar claims similarly. The Court, how-
ever, in Wilson again emphasized its position in Board of Regents v.
Tomanio96 that the need for national uniformity in civil rights ac-
tions standing alone cannot override local statutes of limitations.97
IV. Conclusion
Section 1983 provides a private plaintiff with a civil cause of
action for deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed rights under
color of law. Congress has not specifically enacted a statute of limi-
tations applicable to these actions. When Congress fails to provide
an appropriate limitations period, the federal courts "adopt" or
"borrow" a local statute of limitations as federal law as long as this
period does not conflict with federal law or federal policy concerns.
In Wilson v. Garcia,98 the Supreme Court directed the lower
courts to "adopt" the local statute of limitations applicable to per-
sonal injury actions in section 1983 cases. This decision cured
many problems faced by the lower courts when applying a local lim-
itations period to section 1983 actions. However, a serious prob-
lem still remains after Wilson: state legislatures enact statutes of
limitations to advance their own interests. Because section 1983
actions are subject to state limitations periods, states are given an
opportunity to impose their own will over federal law.
Ideally, Congress should legislate a specific limitations period
for either section 1983 actions individually or for civil rights claims
generally.99 The result should be a well-reasoned process of bal-
ancing the federal interest in enforcing civil rights law with the poli-
cies supporting repose.
95 Id. at 1947. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
96 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
97 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1947.
98 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
99 Congress recently considered but failed to enact a number of bills designed to stand-
ardize the § 1983 limitations period. See, e.g., S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1983,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Congressional action would not be unprecedented. Congress has enacted some federal
statutes of limitations in areas where state statutes had formerly been adopted. For exam-
ple, Congress enacted a limitation period applicable to the Clayton Act in 1955 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982)). Also, in 1897 Congress enacted legislation to limit
patent claims (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1982)).
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As an alternative, Congress could enact a general limitations
statute to apply to all federal actions unless separately provided for
in federal law.100 Such sweeping legislation would be easily applied
and would cure a major problem. Use of this method, however,
bypasses the sound reasoning process necessary to fine-tune the
law to meet the needs of all the complex and sometimes competing
interests involved.
Use of either method is preferable to use of neither method, or
even worse, no action at all. The Wilson Court could have pre-
scribed the minimum limitations period necessary to vindicate the
federal interests involved in section 1983 cases. 10 1 By doing so, the
Supreme Court would have, for all practical purposes, laid to rest
the question of what the appropriate statute of limitations is for sec-
tion 1983 claims. Until either Congress or the Supreme Court acts
on this issue, the federal courts will have to continue untangling the
problems still remaining after Wilson.
Lee L. Cameron, Jr.
100 Several commentators favor this position. See, e.g., Blume & George, Limitations and
the Federal Courts, 49 MicH. L. REv. 937, 992-93 (1951); Recent Cases, 32 MINN. L. REV. 65,
68 (1947); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 77-78
(1953); Note, Disparities in Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YAuE LJ. 738, 745
(1940). Congress unsuccessfully attempted to legislate a one year limitations period appli-
cable to federal statutory rights of action which have no limitations provision. See S. 1013,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) and H.R. 2788, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
I01 In order to avoid a criticism ofjudicial activism, the Court should have fashioned this
remedy consistent with the § 1988 borrowing provision.
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